Windows-Updates

Microsoft dismisses Windows 7 UAC security flaw, continues to insist it is “by design”

• This is not a vulnerability. The intent of the default configuration of UAC is that users don’t get prompted when making changes to Windows settings. This includes changing the UAC prompting level.
• Microsoft has received a great deal of usability feedback on UAC prompting behavior in UAC, and has made changes in accordance with user feedback.
• UAC is a feature designed to enable users to run software at user (non-admin) rights, something we refer to as Standard User. Running software as standard user improves security reduces TCO.
• The only way this could be changed without the user’s knowledge is by malicious code already running on the box.
• In order for malicious code to have gotten on to the box, something else has already been breached (or the user has explicitly consented)

The whole reason why I had made the “issue” public yesterday was because private Windows 7 beta-testers were frustrated at how Microsoft treated their concerns, but it seems like it hasn’t changed.

What I do not understand is how they are treating the seriousness of this problem. The proof-of-concept VBScript Rafael and I had come up with was intentionally as obvious as possible. A malicious application could be much more silent and visually discreet, plus add in additional code to load even more malicious applications after a reboot then running with full administrative privileges.

Microsoft’s argument is entirely based on the user, which I agree to an extent - they have to download and execute such an application, but remembering this can be a low-privileged application so it would have no warnings what so ever.

How could a low-privileged application be able to turn off the entire privileged-applications security-layer not be a security flaw? Let me repeat, a low-privileged application, some people seems to have missed that. I just don’t get it.

In contrast, if they implemented a solution as I have suggested, even if a low-privileged application (without UAC prompts) tried to turn off UAC, there is a last line of defense just before UAC is turned off to give the user a second chance. One more chance than no chance at all.